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Miles: Torts

TORTS
I.

WRONGFUL BIRTH, WRONGFUL LIFE, AND WRONGFUL
PREGNANCY CAUSES OF ACTION

James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
Courts have used several terms to describe causes of action involving a physician's negligence that results in unplanned pregnancies or birth.' In James G. v.
Caserta, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals examined for the first time
issues underlying these concepts. 2
The court began by defining a wrongful pregnancy as one where the failed
sterilization procedure has resulted in the birth of a healthy child. 3 A wrongful
birth applies to those cases where the child is born with a birth defect.4 Claims
for a wrongful birth are asserted by the handicapped child's parents, whereas, claims
for wrongful life are asserted by the handicapped child against the mother's attending physician. James G. was a consolidation of two cases with interrelated issues
dealing with the rights of parents and their children to recover damages against
health care providers. 6
In the first case, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, decided not to have any
more children; therefore, the wife underwent a tubal ligation. Subsequently, the
wife became pregnant and delivered a healthy child. The plaintiffs then brought
an action to recover damages from the alleged negligently performed tubal ligation." In exploring the wrongful pregnancy issue, the court noted that the liability
theory used in these cases is that the physician was negligent in performing the
sterilization procedure and as a consequence the parents conceived a child for whom
they had not planned.' The physician's negligence is a breach of the duty owed
to the parents. 9 After applying a traditional tort analysis, the court followed the
majority of jurisdictions and concluded there is a cause of action for a wrongful
pregnancy."
The court next addressed what type of damages are recoverable in a wrongful
pregnancy action." Applying general rules governing damages, the court found the
following damages to be recoverable:
(1) any medical and hospital expenses incurred as a result of a physician's negligence,
including the cost of the initial unsuccessful sterilization operation, prenatal care,
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 874 (W. Va. 1985).
Id. at 872.

Id. at 875.
Id.

Id. at 879.
6 Id. at 874.

7Id.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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childbirth, postnatal care, and a second sterilization operation, if obtained; (2) the
physical and mental pain suffered by the wife as a result of the pregnancy and
subsequent childbirth and as a result of undergoing two sterilization operations;
and (3) recovery for the loss of consortium and loss of wages.' 2
These damages are recoverable in the majority of jurisdictions.' 3
The plaintiffs also sought recovery for the anticipated costs of rearing and
educating their healthy child.' 4 The courts that have addressed this issue have
generally held that these expenses cannot be recovered either because the award
would be too speculative or would violate public policy.' 5 In addressing this claim,
the court applied the rule established in Jordan v. Bero.'6 The test is as follows:
To form a legal basis for recovery of future permanent consequences of the negligent
infliction of a personal injury, it must appear with reasonable certainty that such
consequences will result from the injury; contingent or merely possible future injurious effects are too remote and speculative to support a lawful recovery.' 7
Finding the damages of child rearing expenses too speculative, the court held they
cannot be recovered in a wrongful pregnancy action.' 8
The second case addressed by the court involved genetic counseling.' 9 The issue
before the court was one of first impression,2" addressing whether a child who is
born with a birth defect has a cause of action against the mother's attending physician. 2 ' In this case, the parents claimed that the physician failed to perform an
amniocentesis test on the wife, which would have revealed the birth defects of their
child.2" Applying the traditional tort analysis, the court noted the following:
One of the underlying premises in this area of the law is that the birth defect is
not curable while the child is in the fetal stage. Consequently, the physician is not
being charged with failure to cure the birth defect, but rather with the failure to
give the parents information about it so that an informed choice could be made.

Id. at 877.
See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilber v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d
568 (1982); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves,
252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. App. 1982); Kingsbury
v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp., 449 Pa. 484,
453 A.2d 974 (1982); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982); McKernan v. Aasheim,
102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984) (en banc); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
" James G.,
332 S.E.2d at 876.
Id. at 877.
'
Jordan v. Bero, 158 W. Va. 28, 210 S.E.2d 618 (1974).
" James G.,
332 S.E.2d at 878 (citing Jordan, 158 W. Va. at 29, 210 S.E.2d at 622).
Id. at 878.
"
"

19

Id.

20 Id.
21

at 879.

Id.
I'
Id.
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This duty to inform does not extend to the unborn child as it is the parents' decision to risk conception or terminate pregnancy."
Based on this analysis, the court concluded a claim for wrongful life does not exist
in the absence of any statute giving rise to such a cause of action. 4
Unlike its rejection of a wrongful life claim, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth actions." In this situation, the negligence is based on a duty to furnish reasonable medical care and to
advise the parents of the possibility of birth defects. Breach of this duty can be
demonstrated. 6 In this type of action, the parents may recover the extraordinary
costs for rearing a child with birth defects, not only during his minority, but also
after the child reaches majority if the child is unable to support himself because
of physical or emotional disabilities. 2"

II.

MANDOLIDIS-TYPE ACTIONS

Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 326 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1984).

Under the West Virginia Code, damages recoverable in a Mandolidis-type suit
are limited to "excess" damages above those provided by workers' compensation."
The statute is silent as to how these damages are implemented at trial. 9 In Mooney
v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.," the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
addressed for the first time how to mechanically implement excess damages awarded
to a plaintiff under the deliberate intent provisions of the West Virginia Code.
The court stated that matters which could be proved with reasonable certainty by
accepted scientific evidence or expert testimony may be considered in computing
the value of a compensation award for purposes of establishing the basic amount
from which excess damages may be calculated under West Virginia Code section
23-4-2.1' Finally, the court noted, when damages in a wrongful death action involve both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, the general rule is that damages
11Id.
24

at 881.

Id.

11Id. at 882.
26

Id.

1, Id. at 882-83.
1, Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 326 S.E.2d 427, 430 (W. Va. 1984); See W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-2 (1969).
11 Mooney, 326 S.E.2d at 430. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1985) provides in pertinent part:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce
such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee shall
have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have a cause of action against the employer
as if this chapterhad not been enacted,for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable
under this chapter. (emphasis added).
Mooney, 326 S.E.2d 427.
Id. at 431.
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for pecuniary loss should be calculated at present value and damages for nonpecuniary loss should not.3 2
In Mooney, Roger Dale Mooney was an employee of the defendant, Eastern
Associated Coal Corporation. 33 On February 2, 1977, Mr. Mooney died as a result
of injuries he had sustained in a roof fall two days earlier. His wife and daughter
were awarded workers' compensation benefits. Subsequently, Mrs. Mooney filed
suit against Eastern for both compensatory and punitive damages under the
deliberate intent provisions of West Virginia Code section 23-4-2. In her civil suit,
Mrs. Mooney alleged that Eastern's conduct was willful, wanton, and reckless in
that they directed her husband to work on premises they knew were extremely
dangerous and violated federal and safety standards.34
In order to recover in a Mandolidis-type action, the plaintiff must prove that
the employer's misconduct was intentional or of a willful, wanton, and reckless
character;" that the employee had knowledge and appreciation of the high degree
of risk of physical harm; 36 and finally, the employer's action must be the proximate cause of the injury." During the trial, the jury was not allowed to hear
evidence about the worker's compensation benefits. They returned a verdict against
Eastern, awarding Mrs. Mooney $350,000 compensatory damages and the decedent's daughter $500,000 compensatory damages. Following the verdict, the trial
judge offset the jury award by the value of the workers' compensation benefits
the two were entitled to receive. On appeal, Eastern contended that there was insufficient evidence to support an award under the deliberate intent provisions because
there was evidence that Eastern had taken measures to correct the hazardous conditions. Mrs. Mooney argued that the trial court erred when it reduced the jury
verdict by the value of the workers' compensation benefits she and her daughter
38
were entitled to receive.
After reviewing the trial transcript, the supreme court concluded that reasonable
minds could differ about whether the evidence warranted a finding of deliberate
intent to produce injury or death. The trial transcript included evidence that the
roof in the section of the mine where Mr. Mooney was killed was in an extremely
hazardous condition, that there had been numerous roof falls in the accident area
before and after Mr. Mooney's fall on January 31, 1977, and that the defendant
had received numerous citations for federal mine safety standard violations in that
section of the mine. Based on the evidence, the issue was properly submitted to
the jury.9
12 Id.
" Id. at 429.
"4 Id.

I/d.(citing Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., 310 S.E.2d 835 (W. Va. 1983)).
Id. at 429.
3, Id.
38 Id.
3I

39 Id.
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The court then addressed how damages in excess of the workers' compensation
award should be implemented at trial. The court stated that implicit in the language
of West Virginia Code section 23-4-2, is the requirement that the factfinder know
what the compensation award will be. In other words, evidence of the value of
that any
the compensation benefits must be submitted to the jury with instructions 40
verdict for the plaintiff shall include damages in excess of the benefits.
Next the court noted that in compensation cases involving awards of death
benefits, the jury must determine future damages.41 To do this, the jury can use
information that can be proved with reasonable certainty by accepted scientific
evidence and expert testimony, such as reliable mortality tables.42 Additionally, the
court noted there was evidence that the Workers' Compensation Commission
establishes a "reserve fund figure" that represents the Commissioner's estimate
of the total value of an award of dependents' death benefits. If such a figure exists
and it is calculated with reasonable certainty, the court felt this was the best proof
of calculating excess damages under West
of compensation benefits for purposes
4
1
23-4-2.
section
Code
Virginia
Finally, the court stated that the lower court erred in reducing the entire verdict
to its present value. The majority of jurisdictions, including West Virginia, follow
the general rule that an award -for pecuniary damages, such as loss of income, should
be reduced to present
value; however, non-pecuniary damages, such as mental
44
anguish, should not.
Justice Miller, dissenting, felt that as a matter of law the plaintiffs had failed
to show intentional or willful and wanton conduct on the part of the employer. 4
Since this is the standard that must be met under the West Virginia Code,46 a directed
verdict should have been granted for the defendant."' In contrasting this case with
Mandolidis,4 he concluded that 4Eastern
was not acting in a willful or intentional
9
manner to injure its employees. '
Next, Justice Miller believed the better procedure to follow in a Mandolidis-

Id. at 430.
I
Id.
Id. at 431.
I
Id.
I'
IId.

"
6

Id. at 432.

V. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1985).
, Mooney, 326 S.E.2d at 433.
Under Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), it is essential,
in order for an injured employee to recover, that the employer's misconduct must be of an intentional
or wilful, wanton and reckless character, that the employer must have knowledge and appreciation
of the high degree of risk of physical harm to another created by such misconduct, and, of course,
that the employer's action must be the proximate cause of the injury.
" Mooney, 326 S.E.2d at 429 (quoting Cline, 310 S.E.2d 835 (1983)).
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type suit, would be to have a bifurcated trial. In the first part of the trial, liability
and damages would be decided. In the second part of the trial, the jury would
determine the workers' compensation benefits offset to be received by the plaintiff."0 Even though the lower court followed Justice Miller's recommended procedure, he felt the trial court made two errors." First, the trial judge should not
2
have apportioned the workers' compensation benefits between the two plaintiffs.
Secondly, when he calculated the total amount of receivable death benefits offset
based on the widow's life expectancy he should not have applied this offset to the
3
combined damage awards of the widow and the daughter.1
The Mooney decision makes it clear that when an action is brought under the
deliberate intent provisions of the former Workers' Compensation Act, evidence
of the value of compensation benefits must be submitted to the jury with instructions that any verdict for the plaintiff shall include damages in excess of the
benefits. 4

III.

INSURANCE

Davis v. Robertson, 332 S.E.2d 819 (W. Va. 1985).
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va.
1985).
In Davis v. Robertson,55 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
called upon to determine whether or not a plaintiff may bring a direct action against
an insurance company without first obtaining a judgment against the insured.
Davis, arose from an automobile collision on in Wayne, West Virginia. 6 The
plaintiff, a passenger in the car driven by her husband, defendant Jack Davis, was
injured when their car collided with a vehicle driven by Robert J. Robertson. Mrs.
Davis filed suit against both drivers. 7 Mr. Davis was represented by counsel provided by his insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State
Farm), and Mr. Robertson, an uninsured motorist, represented himself.5 8 Prior to
trial, Mr. Robertson learned that if he did not continue to appear and defend himself,
State Farm would pursue a subrogation claim against him for any amount it was
required to pay the plaintiff because of his negligence. 9 When the plaintiff's counsel
50

Id. at 433.

Id.
,2 Id. at 433-34.
"

" Id. at 434.
14 Id. at 430.
11 Davis v. Robertson, 332 S.E.2d 819 (W. Va. 1985).
11 Id. at 820.
17 Id.
51 Id. at 820-21.
11 Id. at 821.
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learned of this, he filed a motion to join State Farm as a real party in interest.
The trial court denied this motion and certified this issue to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. 0
The first question addressed was whether a liability insurer of a defendant in
a civil action is a real party in interest and an indispensable party in the action
and includable as a defendant in that action. 6' The court, in answering this question, followed its longstanding rule and the majority position that, prior to a judgment against the insured, an injured plaintiff cannot join the defendant's insurance
company in a suit for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. 2 The insurer
cannot be joined as a defendant with an insured unless a right of joinder is conferred by statute or by the terms of the policy itself." Because the West Virginia
statute does not expressly authorize a direct action of joinder, the insurer could not
be joined with the insured. 4 The reasoning behind this rule is to avoid the unnecessary mention of insurance coverage at trial because of its possible prejudicial
6
effect on a jury's verdict. 1
The second certified question focused on whether the West Virginia Uninsured
Motorist Statute6 6 permits a plaintiff to bring a direct action against his or her
own carrier which provided the uninsured motorist coverage. 67 This statute specifically sets out procedures for suing uninsured motorists, whether they are known,

6I

Id.

66

Id. at 820.

Id. at 821-22, See Magras v. Puerto Rican American Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 427 (D.V.I. 1982);
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n., 456 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Globe Indem. Co.
v. Teixeira, 230 F. Supp, 444 (D, Hawaii 1963); Baughman v. Harbor Ins. Co., 450 So.2d 1096 (Ala.
1984); Butler v. Sequeira, 100 Cal, App.2d 143, 223 P.2d 48 (1950); Smith v. Commercial Union Assur.
Co., 246 Ga, 50, 268 SE.2d 632 (1980); Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co. v. Freight Delivery Serv., Inc.,
133 Ga. App, 92, 210 S.E.2d 42 (1974); Olokele Sugar Co. v. McCabe, 53 Hawaii 69, 487 P.2d 769
(1971)z Pacattello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980); White
v. Goodvillk Mut, Cas, Co., 226 Kan. 191, 596 P.2d 1229 (1979); Davis v. Furlong, 328 N.W.2d 150
(Mitrn, 1983), Chapman v. Farmers Ins. Group, 90 NM. 18, 558 P.2d 1157 (Ct. App. 1976); Zeigler
v, Ryza. 63 S.D, 607, 262 NA. 200 (1935); Russell v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.
Civ, App, 1977).
61 Dqvis,, $32 SE,2.d at 822.
66 Id. at 823.
65 Idt.
62

66
6"

6'

W. VA, CoDE § 33-6-31(b) (1982).
Dv is, 2 S.E.2d at 824.
V. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(d) provides:

Any insured intending to rely on the coverage required by subsection (b) of this section shall,
if any action be instituted against the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, cause
a copy of the summons and a copy of the complaint to be served upon the insurance company issuing the policy, in the manner prescribed by law, as though such insurance company
were a named party defendant, such company shall thereafter have the right to file pleadings
and to, take other action allowable by law in the name of the owner, or operator, or both,
of the uninsured motor vehicle or in its own name.
Nothing in this subsection shall prevent such owner or operator from employing
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or unknown.6 9 The court determined that the statute does not authorize a direct
action against the insurance company that provides the uninsured motorist coverage
until a judgment has been obtained against the uninsured motorist.7" In reaching
this decision, the court quoted the Virginia case of O'Brien v. Government
Employees Insurance Co.7 In that case, the court stated that the existence of John

Doe procedures, which were designed to simulate a suit against a known motorist,
indicated that the legislature wanted this procedure to be part of the recovery

mechanism. John Doe procedures avoid possible prejudgment on the liability issue
by preventing the jury from being informed of the existence of insurance."' The

West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in dismissing the case, concluded that
this analysis was equally
applicable to the language in the West Virginia Uninsured
3
Motorist Statute.
In Shamblin v. NationwideMutual Insurance Co.,14 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals interpreted the term "occurrence" to apply only to the resulting
event for which the insured becomes liable and not to some antecedent cause(s)
of the injury. 75 The court held that when the insurance policy contains language
limiting the insurer's liability as a result of one occurrence, regardless of the number

counsel of his own choice and taking any action in his own interest in connection with such
proceeding.
69 W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(e) provides in relevant part:
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage
to the insured be unknown, the insured, or someone in his behalf, in order for the insured
to recover under the uninsured motorist endorsement or provision, shall:
(i) Within twenty-four hours after the insured discover, and being physically able
to report the occurrence of such accident, the insured, or someone in his behalf, shall report
the accident to a police, peace or judicial officer, or to the commissioner of motor vehicles,
unless the accident shall already have been investigated by a police officer; and
(ii) Notify the insurance company, within sixty days after such accident, that the
insured or his legal representative has a cause or causes of action arising out of such accident
for damages against a person or persons whose identity is unknown and setting forth the
facts in support thereof; . . .
(iii) Upon trial establish that the motor vehicle, which caused the bodily injury
or property damage, whose operator is unknown, was a 'hit and run' motor vehicle. . .. If
the owner or operator of any motor vehicle causing bodily injury or property damage be
unknown, an action may be instituted against the unknown defendant as 'John Doe,' in the
county in which the accident took place . ..; service of process may be made by delivery
of a copy of the complaint and summons or other pleadings to the clerk of the court in
which the action is brought, and service upon the insurance company issuing the policy shall
be made and prescribed by law as though such insurance company were a party defendant.
The insurance company shall have the right to file pleadings and take other action allowable
by law in the name of John Doe.
70Davis, 332 S.E.2d at 826.
" O'Brien v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1967).
,2Id. at 339.
" Davis, 332 S.E.2d at 826.
" Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1985).
' Id. at 644.
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of automobiles to which the policy applies, the insured is not entitled to stack liability
coverages for each vehicle for which the insured has paid a separate premium. 76
On or about January 16, 1977, Clarence Shamblin purchased an automobile
liability policy from Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide). The
policy covered several vehicles and was limited to $100,000 for each person, $300,000
for each occurrence, and $50,000 for property damage. In April 1977, three of
Mr. Shamblin's employees were driving three of the insured vehicles. 7" During their
trip, the drivers communicated with each other by citizens band radios when it
was clear to pass other vehicles. 78 On one occasion, another driver, allegedly
one of the other employees, radioed to another employee, Owens, that it was safe
for him to pass a truck. As Owens attempted to pass the truck, he collided with
it and an oncoming vehicle. The driver and a passenger in the oncoming vehicle
were injured and subsequently brought a civil action for their injuries. In that action, the plaintiffs were awarded $775,000 in damages and the liability was apportioned ninety percent against the defendant.
While this personal injury action was pending, Mr. Shamblin learned from
Nationwide that even if it was determined that more than one of his vehicles had
contributed to the accident, the policy limits for personal injury and property damage
for each vehicle would not be available to him. Consequently, Mr. Shamblin commenced a declaratory judgment, asking the court to construe the insurance policy
and to declare that the liability limits for each vehicle contributing to the accident
were available to him. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled that there was
one "occurrence" within the meaning of the insurance policy; therefore, Nationwide's liability to Mr. Shamblin were the policy limits of $100,000 per person,
$300,000 for each occurrence, and $50,000 for property damage. 7 9
On appeal, the supreme court initially addressed the issue whether the insurance
policy's definition of "each occurrence" was ambiguous. 0 The policy defines "one
occurrence" as injury or damage "arising out of continuous or repeated exposure
to substantially the same general conditions."'" In holding the definition was not
ambiguous, the court applied the test set forth in Prete v. Merchants Property
Insurance Co.82 This test for ambiguity states that "[w]henever the language of
an insurance policy provision is reasonably susceptible of two different meanings
or is of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree
as to its meaning, it is ambiguous." 83
76

Id. at 646.

11 Id. at 640.
11 Id. at 641.
9 Id.
so Id.

s Id. at n.3.
82 Prete v. Merchants Property Ins. Co., 159 W. Va. 508, 223 S.E.2d 441 (1976).
Surbaugh v. Stonewall Casualty Co., 283 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1981) (quoting Prete, 223 S.E.2d
at 441).
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After reviewing a substantial amount of case law, the court concluded the definition set forth in the policy was consistent with both the legal meaning" and common usage85 of the term occurrence. To determine whether or not there has been
one or more occurrences, the relative closeness of the connection in time and space
between cause and result must be analyzed.86 Here, the insurance policy definition
was consistent with the emphasis on closeness in time and space.8 '
The appellant also argued that these were two separate acts of negligence;
therefore, there was an "occurrence" for each of the appellant's vehicles. 8" The
first alleged negligent act occurred when the employee signaled to Owens it was
safe to pass. The second negligent act was passing the truck.89 Assuming that there
were two negligent acts involving two of the insured's drivers, the court stated that
at most there was concurrent negligence which was the proximate cause of one
event. 98 The term "occurrence" in a limitation of liability clause within an
automobile liability insurance policy refers to the resulting event for which the insured becomes legally liable and not to antecedent causes. In this case, there may
or may not have been two antecedent negligent acts but there was only one resulting
occurrence. 9'
The court stated that there was clear language in the insurance policy which
precluded ambiguity arising from the purported conflict between the payment of
separately computed premiums for each vehicle.92 The policy's separability provision assures that the policy applies to whichever automobile is involved in the
accident, and it does no more. 93 When an automobile liability insurance policy contains language limiting the insurer's liability as a result of one occurrence,
"[r]egardless of the number of .. . automobiles to which this policy applies,"
the insured is not entitled to "stack" liability coverage for each vehicle for which
the insured has paid a separate premium. 94
Finally, a limitation of liability clause within an automobile liability insurance
" Shamblin, 332 S.E.2d at 644. ("The cases have consistently construed 'occurrence' and "accident' in liability policies to mean the event for which the insured becomes liable, and not some antecedent cause of the injury.") (quoting Champion Int'l Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 546 F.2d 502
(2d Cir. 1976)).

11Shamblin, 332 S.E.2d at 643. ("[W]hen ordinary people speak of an 'accident' in the usual
sense, they are referring to a single, sudden, unintentional occurrence. They normally use the word

'accident' to describe the event, no matter how many persons or things are involved.") (quoting
Saint-Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689, 691 (5th Cir. 1955)).
86

Shamblin, 332 S.E.2d at 643.

Id.
""Id. at 641.
87

'~Id.

90 Id.
91

at 644.

Id.

93

Id. at 645.
Id.

14

Id. at 646.

11
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policy that limits coverage for any one occurrence, regardless of the number of
covered vehicles, does not violate any applicable insurance statute or regulation.
In addition, there is no judicial policy that prevents the insurer from limiting his
liability and also collecting a premium for each covered vehicle because each premium
is for the increased risk of an occurrence.9"

IV.

DEFAMATION

Mutafis v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 328 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1985).
In Mutafis v. Erie Insurance Exchange,96 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals found that it is maliciously critical of and derogatory to a person's
financial condition to assert that they are closely associated with the Mafia.
Therefore, because the West Virginia Code9 7 prohibits the dissemination of false
or maliciously critical statements, the code was violated. 9 Similarly, the court found a
violation of West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(5) 99 which prohibits the insertion
of false material about a person's financial condition in a private business file or
publication of such material to the public.' Neither of these code provisions will
give rise to a cause of action if any of the common law privileges of traditional
libel or slander law apply. Although it appears that the code establishes absolute
liability, the court held that when the Legislature created West Virginia Code sections
33-11-4(3) and (5) they intended these provisions to be interpreted with the common law defamation privileges as necessary qualifications to the statute.' 0'
During the summer of 1979, the plaintiff, Ms. Mutafis reported to her insurer,

95 Id.

96

Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 328 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1985).

"

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (Supp. 1985) provides as follows:

(3) Defamation-No person shall make, publish, disseminate, or circulate, directly or indirectly, or aid, abet or encourage the making, publishing, disseminating or 'circulating of
any oral or written statement or any pamphlet, circular, article or literature which is false,
or maliciously critical of or derogatory to the financial condition of any person and which
is calculated to injure such person.
"' Mutafis, 328 S.E.2d at 680.
" W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(5) provides as follows:
(5) False statements and entries
(a) No person shall knowingly file with any supervisory or other public official,
or knowingly make, publish, disseminate, circulate or deliver to any person, or place before
the public, or knowingly cause directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated,
circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public, any false material statement
of fact as to the financial condition of a person.
(b) No person shall knowingly make any false entry of a material fact in any book
report or statement of any person or knowingly omit to make a true entry of any material
fact pertaining to the business of such person in any book, report or statement of such person.
100Mutafis, 328 S.E.2d at 680.
Id.
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Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie), that her vehicle had been stolen." °2 Richard Kimble, the claims adjuster for Erie, investigated the loss. After the vehicle was stolen,
it was found stripped and burned. Later, Ms. Mutafis was paid for this loss in
accordance with her insurance policy.
Three weeks later, Vincent Oliverio, Ms. Mutafis's cousin, reported the theft
of his vehicle to Erie. Mr. Kimble also investigated this claim; however, unlike
Ms. Mutafis' claim there was a significant delay in paying Mr. Oliverio for his
loss. When Mr. Oliverio questioned Mr. Kimble about the delay, he was told that
Erie was investigating his involvement with the reported loss. Mr. Oliverio's vehicle was later found stripped and burned, but because Erie could not substantiate
his involvement in the loss, his claim was paid.' 3
Despite payment of the claim, Mr. Oliverio filed suit against Erie on the grounds
that Mr. Kimble had libeled and slandered him, uttered "insulting words," and
engaged in improper conduct in handling his claim. During the course of discovery,
Mr. Oliverio obtained a confidential memorandum from Mr. Kimble's supervisor
to Erie's Home Office Audit Department. The memo stated, "Please reference for
your information to file W017415, this is a relative and associated
with Mafia very
'4
heavily, although may have no connection whatever."' 1
During the Oliverio trial, the memo was introduced as evidence and an article
describing it appeared in the local newspaper. At the conclusion of the trial, Mr.
Oliverio told Ms. Mutafis that the memorandum referred to her file." ' As a result,
Ms. Mutafis filed suit against Erie asserting several theories of liability.' 6 At trial
the jury returned a verdict for both compensatory and punitive damages based on
07
the theory that Erie had violated West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(3) or (5).1
On appeal, the Chief Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals certified
three questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.' 0
The first issue addressed by the supreme court was whether the actions
of Erie, its agents, servants, or employees were in violation of West Virginia
Code sections 33-11-4(3) and (5)." The testimony at trial unequivocally
demonstrated that both Kimble and his supervisor had no basis whatsoever for
stating that the plaintiff was associated with the Mafia."10 As a result, there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Erie's employees placed
information in the plaintiff's file they knew to be false. Moreover, the testimony

0

Id. at 677.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

,o1Id. at 678.
,07See supra notes 126-27.
1*o

Mutafis, 328 S.E.2d at 678.

Id.
Id. at 679.
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supported the jury finding that Erie's employees acted intentionally, recklessly, and
willfully in placing the memorandum in the plaintiff's file.'
Having answered the first question affirmatively, the court went on to determine whether or not the common law defense of qualified privileges was available. II2
The court noted its decision was controlled by the reasoning in Mauck v. City
of Martinsburg.' In that case, the court held that the common law defenses
of privilege, developed in the decisional law of libel and slander, apply to the
statutory cause of action for insulting words."" When a person publishes in good
faith that in which he has an interest or duty and limits the publication of the
statement to persons who have a legitimate interest in the subject matter, the writing
or speech is privileged." ' Although West Virginia Code sections 33-11-4(3) and
(5) appear to establish absolute liability, the court determined it was not the intention of the Legislature to so circumscribe necessary business communication as to
establish absolute liability without fault.' 6 However, here there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding that Erie's employees placed information
in the plaintiff's file which they knew to be false. As with the common law tort
of defamation, there is no privilege for the intentional publication of false material. I"
The court then addressed whether a private cause of action exists to enforce
the Unfair Trade Practices Act."' In answering this question, the court applied
the test set forth in Hurley v. Allied Chemical Corp."9 :
(1) the plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted; (2) consideration must be given to legislative intent, express or implied,
to determine whether a private cause of action was intended; (3) an analysis must
be made of whether a private cause of action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; (4) such private cause of action must not intrude
into an area delegated exclusively to the federal government.' 2'
Here, the test was met, and the court therefore held that there is a private cause
of action for violation of West Virginia Code sections 33-11-4(3) and (5)."2,
V.

CAUSES OF ACTION AS

THEY

RELATE TO CORPSES

Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1985).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that unlawful disinterI Id.
12

Id. at 680.

Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 280 S.E.2d 216 (1981).
"" Mutafis, 328 S.E.2d at 680 (citing W. VA. CODE § 55-7-2 (1981)).
"I Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 217.
116 Mutafis, 328 S.E.2d at 680.
"'
Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 681.
" Hurley v. Allied Chemical Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1980).
I10 at 758.
Id.
S.E.2d Repository
at 681.
,2, Mutafis,
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ment of a corpse can give rise to damages.' In Whitehair v. Highland Memory
Gardens, Inc.,' 23 the court was presented with a question of first impression as
to whether a person can recover damages for mental anguish caused by intentional,
reckless, or negligent mishandling of a relative's remains when the removal itself
is lawful. " 4
In Whitehair, the defendant, Highland Memory Gardens, entered into a contract with the West Virginia Department of Highways to remove and relocate bodies
buried in the Old Baptist Cemetary in Buckhannon, West Virginia. The plaintiff
had several relatives buried in the cemetary. In her complaint, Ms. Whitehair alleged
that the defendant lost the remains of her sister and her aunt and failed to remove
the remains of her cousins.'I 5 As a result of the defendant's negligent, willful, wanton, and reckless actions, the plaintiff claimed to have suffered great mental anguish.
She did not allege any pecuniary loss or physical injury.'26
The court held that even when removal of a relative's remains is lawful, a person can recover for mental anguish caused by the intentional, reckless, or negligent
mishandling of the remains.' 27 In making its decision, the court found that there
is a "quasi-property" right in the survivors to control the disposition of a loved
one's remains.'2 8 This includes the right to receive the body in the condition in
which it was left, without mutilation, to have the body treated with decent respect,
and to bury or otherwise dispose of the body without interference. Also included
in these rights are, when possible, the survivors right to notice and reasonable
opportunity to be present when bodies are moved from one resting place to
another. 2 9 Thus, the defendant's alleged failure to notify the plaintiff of the date
of disinterment and to give her reasonable opportunity to be there was actionable.' 3 °
Furthermore, the alleged losing of bodies and body parts was also actionable. 3'
Next, the court, in a question of first impression, held that a suit could be
brought seeking damages for mental anguish, even if the disinterment was
authorized. 32 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that this is an exception
to the general rule that damages for mental distress cannot ordinarily be recovered
for a negligent act that does not provide some physical injury. In cases involving
the negligent mishandling of corpses, there is a special likelihood of genuine and
,22See Sherrard v. Henry, 88 W. Va. 315, 106 S.E. 705 (1921); England v. Central Pocahontas
Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920); Ritter v. Couch, 71 W. Va. 221, 76 S.E. 428 (1912).
"' Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc. 327 S.E.2d 438 (W.Va. 1985).
,14Id. at 440.

,' Id. at 439.
,26
Id. at 440.
,2,Id. at 442-43.

Id. at 441.
129

Id.

"I Id. at 442.
1' Id.
32 Id. at 443.
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serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a
guarantee that the claim is not spurious. '33
Finally, although not an issue in this case, the court noted that the cause of
action ordinarily belongs to the party with the right to the possession of the body,
this usually being the spouse.' 3 4 In the event the spouse is deceased, the cause of
action passes to the next of kin, in the order established by the statute governing
interstate succession. '
The case was reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court of Upshur County. 36
Jill L. Miles

13 Id.
"3 Id.
," Id. at 443-44.
, Id. at 444.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986

15

